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Employee Perks in Silicon Valley: 
Technology Companies Lead the “Arms 
Race” as Corporate Law Trails in 
Representing Shareholder Interests 
 
Thuy Nguyen* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The practice of providing “in-kind” perks to employees that go 
beyond the traditional benefits of health care coverage and retirement 
plans has spread throughout Silicon Valley technology companies at a 
rapid pace within the last decade.1  At the same time, the value of these 
perks has increased exponentially.2  The widespread adoption of this 
practice suggests that employers view the practice as beneficial to their 
business strategy in two interrelated ways.  First, corporate directors and 
officials view the practice as a tool to recruit talent, boost productivity, 
and increase efficiency.  Second, companies have typically been able to 
avoid paying taxes on the majority of the in-kind perks they provide to 
employees.3 
From a shareholder governance perspective, however, there are 
substantial weaknesses in these two approaches.  With respect to 
developing human resources in general, there is currently no accurate 
metric for measuring how the receipt of in-kind perks contributes to an 
employee’s work performance.  Thus, shareholders are unable to  
 
* I wish to thank Professor Jared Ellias for the expertise and guidance he provided throughout this 
entire process.  I would also like to thank Hastings Business Law Journal’s Editorial Board for their hard 
work in editing this Note, as well as the Executive Board for their encouragement.  Lastly, this Note 
would not have been possible without the unwavering support from my friends and family, especially my 
parents.  
 1. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 290 (2013). 
 2. Ian Sherr, Vexed in the City: Working in Silicon Valley Tech Is Much More Lucrative Than You 
Think, CNET (Aug. 21, 2014, 4:00 AM),  http://www.cnet.com/news/vexed-in-the-city-working-in-
silicon-valley-tech-is-much-more-lucrative-than-you-think/. 
 3. Id. 
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properly assess whether the costs associated with in-kind perks 
ultimately decrease or increase share value.  In addition, should 
shareholders wish to question the use of corporate funds to provide 
lavish perks, there is no effective avenue of recourse under the 
current corporate legal framework.  With respect to the tax 
advantages associated with providing in-kind perks, while this 
practice has enjoyed rapid exponential growth uninterrupted for the 
most part, the law is beginning to catch up.  Several scholars have 
argued that the majority of perks offered fail to qualify for the type of 
tax breaks that the law intended.4  In response, the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) has expressed the intent to revise the tax code based 
on these recommendations.5  The IRS’s interest in monitoring and 
regulating in-kind perks in Silicon Valley thereby casts doubt on the 
financial advantages of this practice. 
This Note addresses this issue by proceeding in three main parts: 
Part I surveys the types of perks offered by employers, Part II 
analyzes the impact of impending changes to the practice of 
employer-provided perks, and Part III criticizes the ineffectiveness of 
the current legal avenue shareholders might pursue to effect change 
and summarizes an interim solution.  Ultimately, this Note seeks to 
identify significant gaps in the practice of employer provided perks, in 
order to foster a conversation between shareholders and management 
regarding the long-term consequences of this practice. 
 
II. RISE OF EMPLOYEE PERKS IN SILICON VALLEY 
 
In order to understand the implications of employer-provided 
perks, it is important to first examine the current landscape.  This 
section will define the geographical boundaries of which the perks are 
concentrated; the demographic to which the perks are directed; and 
the perks themselves, in terms of type, scale, and value. 
Starting in the 1990s, the technology industry in Silicon Valley 
 
 4. See, e.g., Austin L. Lomax, Note, Five-Star Exclusion: Modern Silicon Valley 
Companies Are Pushing the Limits of Section 119 by Providing Tax-Free Meals to Employees, 
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2077, 2105 (2014). 
 5. Mark Maremont, Silicon Valley Cafeterias Whet Appetite of IRS, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 
2014, at B1, http://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valley-cafeterias-whet-appetite-of-irs-140961 
2488. 
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has cultivated a reputation for not only offering employees 
substantial pay,6 but also lavish perks.7  In terms of location, the 
Silicon Valley area is generally known to encompass the following:8 
all of the Santa Clara, San Mateo, and San Francisco counties; 
Fremont, Newark, and Union City of Alameda County; and Scotts 
Valley of Santa Cruz County.9  With respect to the beneficiaries of 
these perks, technology companies generally craft benefits packages 
specifically geared towards engineers, software experts, coding 
whizzes, and other key workers.10  These employees are known as the 
“backbone of the industry’s current boom.”11 
Silicon Valley technology companies offer perks in varying 
degrees of type, scale, and value.  Some employers offer limited 
perks.12  For example, a local research lab for IBM subsidizes lunches 
for employees.13  Similarly, employees at Apple must pay to use the 
on-campus gym, but the company offers subsidized lunch, free coffee, 
tea, and apples.14 
Yet, most companies provide completely subsidized perks 
frequently, or even daily.  For example, Google employees are 
encouraged to dine at any one of the cafeterias and eateries on 
campus completely free of charge.15  Smaller companies with more 
 
 6. Before the practice of providing employee perks began attaining momentum, Silicon 
Valley companies utilized stock options to attract and retain employees, which is now 
considered a standard benefit. See Alisa J. Baker, Stock Options–A Perk that Built Silicon 
Valley, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1992, at A20.   
 7. Paul Caron, Who Pays for Employee Perks at High-Tech Companies?, TAXPROF BLOG 
(Nov. 25, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/11/who-pays-for-employee-perks-
.html. 
 8. While the Silicon Valley is generally known loosely as the “Bay Area,” there is not a 
universal agreement on the precise geographical boundaries of the region. 
 9. While the Silicon Valley Index doesn’t faithfully include the county of San Francisco, it 
is included in this note because of the increasing presence of high tech companies in San 
Francisco and consequently, the spread of employee perks. See Profile of Silicon Valley, 
SILICON VALLEY INDEX, http://www.siliconvalleyindex.org/index.php/profile-of-the-region (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 10. Caron, supra note 7. 
 11. Sherr, supra note 2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Lomax, supra note 4 (citing Kevin Smith, Google Employees Reveal Their Favorite 
Perks Working for the Company, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2013, 11:02 AM), http:// www.busin 
essinsider.com/google-employee-favorite-perks-2013-3?op=1 (listing a variety of employee 
reactions to the many perks that Google offers)). 
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limited office space employ the services of local catering companies.16  
Genentech, a biotechnology corporation headquartered in South San 
Francisco, provides take-home dinners and helps employees find last-
minute care for sick children.17  Many companies throughout Silicon 
Valley offer buses equipped with wireless Internet (“Wi-Fi”) to 
transport employees to and from work, allowing them the luxury of 
working while commuting.18  Evernote, a productivity app maker 
headquartered in Redwood City, offers free house-cleaning services 
twice a month to every full-time worker, from receptionists to top 
executives.19  Employees at other companies, including Netflix and 
Twitter, enjoy unlimited vacation time.20 
Other perks are offered intermittently.  For instance, 
ThousandEyes, a network monitoring company based in San 
Francisco, brought employees to Lake Tahoe for three days in the 
summer.21  For one of those days, the company provided employees 
with vouchers for recreational activities, including zip lining, golfing, 
and boating.22  Employees at Evernote receive a $1,000 stipend to 
“disconnect from work” each year.23 
Some perks verge on extravagant, or even excessive.  At 
Dropcam, a company that manufactures live-streaming cameras, 
CEO Greg Duffy welcomes employees by offering free helicopter 
rides to the destination of their choice.24 
Company perks even extend to employee families as well.  For 
instance, some companies offer employees money to help offset costs 
of childbirth and adoptions.25  When employees at Yahoo adopt or 
give birth to a child, they are given $500, a gift basket, and up to eight 
 
 16. Cadie Thompson, Silicon Valley Start-Ups Take Perks to New Level, CNBC (Aug. 19, 
2013, 1:50 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100971904. 
 17. John C. Goodman, Silicon Valley Employers Go Wild with Lavish Employee Benefits, 
FORBES (Oct. 30, 2012, 9:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoodman/2012/10/30/silicon-
valley-employers-go-wild-with-lavish-employee-benefits/. 
 18. Sherr, supra note 2. 
 19. Matt Richtel, Housecleaning, Then Dinner? Silicon Valley Perks Come Home, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/us/in-silicon-valley-perks-now-begin-
at-home.html?_r=0. 
 20. Sherr, supra note 2. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Thompson, supra note 16. 
 25. Sherr, supra note 2. 
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weeks of paid leave.26  Similarly, Google gives $500 “baby bonding 
bucks” along with up to twenty-two weeks leave for biological 
moms.27  At Facebook, employees are given a gift of $4,000 and 
approximately sixteen weeks of maternity leave.28 
Still, other perks simply buck tradition.  Two Silicon Valley 
giants, Apple and Facebook, now offer female employees the “game-
changing” perk of covering the costs to undergo medical procedures 
to freeze and store their eggs.29  At both companies, the benefits plan 
covers up to $20,000 in medical procedures and costs.30  Employees at 
Facebook began taking advantage of the coverage in 2014.31 
To be sure, not all companies participate in the perks game.  For 
instance, the head of the human resources software startup Zenefits 
argued that he abstains from offering too many of the Silicon Valley 
staples to his employees for fear of attracting employees who join the 
company purely for perks.32  However, companies that refrain from 
providing extensive perks “are becoming the exception, not the 
rule.”33 
The competition to see which companies can devise and dole out 
the most desired and original perks has been characterized as an 
“arms race.”34  Silicon Valley employers strive to outdo each other in 
terms of nonsalary and nonequity benefits.35  ThousandEyes CEO 
Mohit Lad describes the practice as an effort to be original.36  It goes 
beyond “just giving free lunches,” but further, it is about cultivating a 
unique corporate “identity.”37  In fact, the practice has become so 
prevalent that a new sub-industry has surfaced.38  Companies are 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Danielle Friedman, Perk Up: Facebook and Apple Now Pay for Women to Freeze 
Eggs, NBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/perk-face 
book-apple-now-pay-women-freeze-eggs-n225011. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Sherr, supra note 2. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Flora Zhang, Twitter Buys 19th Century Log Cabins for Cafeteria, CNN: MONEY (Mar. 
6, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/06/technology/social/twitter-cabins/. 
 36. Sherr, supra note 2. 
 37. Sherr, supra note 2. 
 38. Rachel Feintzeig, Lavish Perks Spawn New Job Category, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2014, 7:19 
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retaining human resources (“HR”) specialists and tasking them with 
looking for more creative, often valuable benefits.39  For some 
companies and HR specialists, the expectations are beginning to 
become too much to handle.  Jill Hernstat, a recruiter at executive 
search firm Hernstat & Co., observed that prospective or current 
employees would often broadcast the perks they received at their 
former job.40  The expectation then would be for the new employer to 
offer more perks than the former employer, or at the very least, make 
a matching offer.  This is the practice that Hernstat has characterized 
as spiraling to the point where it has become “out of hand.”41 
Obviously, the practice impacts two main classes of people: (1) 
the employers, including the management team, and (2) the 
employees.  However, the increasingly prevalent role that employer-
provided perks play in the human resources component of Silicon 
Valley technology companies should draw the attention of another 
class of key stakeholders: corporate shareholders. 
 
III. THE SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE PROBLEM 
 
Given the volume and enormous costs associated with the 
practice of providing perks, it follows that corporate shareholders 
have a strong interest in the underlying business rationale of the 
policy, and potentially, any options available to exercise their rights as 
shareholders.  While these increasingly extravagant perks have 
garnered considerable attention from the government and the public, 
less attention has been paid to corporate shareholders.  Specifically, 
there is little, if any, literature available analyzing how these perks 
affect shareholder value.  If the value of employee benefits remained 
stagnant, then the concern would not be as pronounced.  However, 
the alarming rate at which the benefits have spread throughout 
technology companies in Silicon Valley—combined with the soaring 
costs and value of the benefits—warrants a closer examination of the 
legal and business ramifications as they relate to shareholders.  This 
 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/lavish-perks-spawn-new-job-category-1416529198; Caron, supra 
note 7. 
 39. Feintzeig, supra note 38. 
 40. Sherr, supra note 2. 
 41. Id. 
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section will outline the business rationales corporate executives offer 
to support the practice of providing employee perks, and explain how 
impending changes in tax law affect the wisdom of these business 
rationales. 
 
A.   INTENDED PURPOSES OF EMPLOYEE PERKS 
 
The history of Silicon Valley involves intense competition for 
employees with competent engineering skills, a phenomenon 
described as an “insatiable demand for engineering talent.”42  As 
early as the 1970s, the practice of providing perks evolved as a 
method for companies to vigorously compete in the market for 
talent.43  Companies began to offer “incentives such as generous 
signing bonuses, stock options, high salaries, and interesting projects 
to attract top people.”44  These aggressive recruiting practices 
progressed through the 1980s and into the 1990s.45  While the demand 
for engineers diminished in the years following the burst of the dot-
com bubble, it quickly swelled again less than a decade later.46  One 
expert described the market for engineering talent in Silicon Valley 
by 2011 as “the most competitive” he had ever seen.47  Today, 
companies continue to maintain the mindset that paying engineers 
“like superstars” is the only way to compete in Silicon Valley’s 
“hypercompetitive” job market.48  Despite the significant costs 
associated from these employee perks, companies nonetheless justify 
the practice on three main grounds: the perks serve to increase 
productivity, recruit talent, and retain valuable human resources. 
 
1.  Efficiency 
 
 42. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 1, at 290. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (citing ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND 
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 35 (9th prtg. 2000)). 
 45. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 1, at 290–91 (citations omitted). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 291 (citing Jessica Guynn, What Recession? It’s Boom Time Again in Silicon 
Valley, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/17/business/la-fi-tech-
boom-20110717). 
 48. Daniel Terdiman, Silicon Valley Talent Wars: Engineers, Come Get Your $250K 
Salary, CNET (Sept. 22, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/silicon-valley-talent-wars-
engineers-come-get-your-250k-salary/. 
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First, most companies justify the policy of providing perks on the 
basis that the perks help employees perform more efficiently.49  
Scientific research seems to support this rationale.  Research 
conducted by psychology experts revealed that social and relaxing 
activities, such as yoga and cardio-kickboxing, tend to increase 
creativity.50  These activities cause a spike in the superior anterior 
temporal gyrus (“aSTG”), the part of the brain responsible for 
drawing together distantly-related information.51  In turn, a spike of 
aSTG enhances creativity, engagement, and innovation.52  As a result, 
engineers who experience this surge can more efficiently perform 
their job.53 
On a practical level, the perks simply save employees time, 
freeing up valuable time that could otherwise be spent working.54  For 
example, if the employer provides a barber on office premises, 
employees would not need to spend time waiting at a salon.55  
Hewlett-Packard, Facebook, Google, and Apple provide doctors and 
health clinics on campus, thereby saving employees from cutting their 
workday short to attend an off-site medical appointment.56  Buses 
equipped with Wi-Fi allow employees to work during the commute.57  
One study conducted by the University of California, Berkeley,58 
 
 49. John Waggoner, Do Happy Workers Mean Higher Company Profits?, USA TODAY: 
MONEY (Feb. 20, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/ 
2013/02/19/ treating-employees-well-stock-price/1839887/. 
 50. John Kounios & Mark Beeman, The Aha! Moment: The Neural Basis of Solving 
Problems with Insight, THE CREATIVITY POST (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.creativitypost.com/ 
science/the_aha_moment._the_cognitive_neuroscience_of_insight#sthash.ztgdhNqU.dpuf; see 
also Jonah Lehrer, How To Be Creative, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 12, 2012, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203370604577265632205015846. 
 51. See supra note 50. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Martha Mendoza, Tech Firms Offering More Perks To Recruit, Retain Talent, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2013, 10:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/31/tech-
firms-increase-office-perks_n_2988687.html. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Sherr, supra note 2. 
 56. Id.;  Zhang, supra note 35. 
 57. Sherr, supra note 2. 
 58. Danielle Dai & David Weinzimmer, Riding First Class: Impacts of Silicon Valley 
Shuttles on Commute & Residential Location Choice (U.C. Berkeley, Working Paper No. 
UCB-ITS-WP-2014-01, Feb. 2014), http://www.danielledai.com/academic/dai-weinzimmer-shut 
tles.pdf. 
 Fall 2015 EMPLOYEE PERKS IN SILICON VALLEY 59 
found that ten percent of technology employees surveyed would quit 
if their employers stopped providing shuttle service to and from the 
worksite.59  Paul Saffo, Stanford University lecturer and managing 
director of Foresight at Discern Analytics stated, “[o]utsiders see 
these things as an extravagance; the companies see them as a 
productivity tool.”60 
 
2.  Recruiting and Retaining Talent 
 
Another driving force behind the practice of offering extensive 
perks is the necessity to attract and retain talent.61  The perks benefit 
employers in two stages: when the employer is initially looking for 
suitable candidates, and when the candidates become employees.  
During the former stage, the benefit to the employers is fairly 
straightforward: the perks attract a larger pool of candidates, from 
which the employer may select qualified employees.  As a general 
rule, more is better.  Simply put: If a prospective employee were 
facing two job opportunities that offered the same salary—all other 
things being equal—the employee would likely choose the company 
that offered an additional perk over the other company. 
During the latter stage, the employer benefits when the perks 
give employees a heightened sense of job satisfaction, inducing them 
to stay with the company.  In addition to the obvious need to hold on 
to talent, employers need to retain employees in order to safeguard 
company secrets.  Because of technological advances and greater 
employment mobility, employers are becoming increasingly 
concerned with trade secret misappropriation in the employment 
arena.62  In Silicon Valley, trade secret law is particularly important 
because intellectual property is one of the most valuable assets to 
technology companies in the area.63  Companies are concerned about 
trade secret misappropriation, both during the time an employee is 
away from the workplace, as well as during the period following an 
 
 59. Dai & Weinzimmer, supra note 58, at 12. 
 60. Zhang, supra note 35. 
 61. Mendoza, supra note 53. 
 62. Hanna Bui-Eve, Note, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies Should 
Know About Hiring Competitors’ Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J 981, 993 (1997). 
 63. Bui-Eve, supra note 62. 
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employee’s termination.64  In the former situation, employers fear 
that employees could disclose company secrets off campus.  Thus, 
companies often provide perks that encourage shorter breaks and 
longer hours spent at the office, such as the famous “sleep pods” 
provided at Google.65 
In the latter situation, businesses have become more concerned 
with the prospect of losing their intellectual properties through 
departing employees.66  Traditionally, fearing possible disclosure of its 
technological knowledge, loss of the employee’s expertise, and the 
subsequent loss of its competitive advantage, former employers sue to 
enjoin the disclosure or use of its trade secrets; alternatively, former 
employers sue to enjoin the departed employee from assuming 
similar responsibilities in his new job.67  However, because covenants 
not to compete are generally unenforceable in California, employers 
must rely on these perks to fill this gap. 
Furthermore, there is an additional advantage to offering perks 
over a higher salary or stock options.  Paying employees in perks 
delivers a substantial “amount of utility in the short term, none of 
which can be saved until later periods.”68  As some scholars suggest, 
good perks are generally “extravagant and non-fungible”—these 
types of perks “cannot be easily convertible to cash, as that would 
enable the employee to save.”69  For instance, paying for an 
employee’s regular haircut is a non-extravagant and fungible perk, 
because this is an expense that the employee would normally incur 
anyway; “the employee simply pockets the amount of the transfer in 
 
 64. Id. at 984. 
 65. Michael Moran, Google Has Sleep Pods, Yelp Has Beer—Why Don’t We Just Live at 
Work?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2014, 6:57 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2014/sep/11/google-sleep-pods-yelp-beer-work-leisure-offices; Zoe Mintz, IRS Plans to Tax Free 
Meals Silicon Valley Companies Dole Out, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014, 4:48 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/irs-plans-tax-free-meals-silicon-valley-companies-dole-out-1679106. 
 66. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case: The Growing Debate over Employee Mobility, 
KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON (Apr. 30, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/silicon-
valleys-poaching-case-growing-debate-employee-mobility/; Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal 
Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and 
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577–78 (1999). 
 67. Bui-Eve, supra note 62, at 985–86. 
 68. M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks, 
Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1863–64 (2005). 
 69. Id. at 1874–75. 
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cash.”70  In contrast, paying for a professional makeover would 
constitute a good perk, because it involves a luxury that the employee 
would not normally purchase.71  These “good perks”—the type that a 
majority of Silicon Valley technology companies offer—give 
employees incentives to work harder, but do not allow employees to 
save for future periods.  As a result, they provide an incentive for the 
employee to remain with the company in order to continue receiving 
such benefits.72 
The need to recruit and retain talent is particularly acute when 
other potentially more effective, cost-efficient methods are 
impractical or no longer available.  For instance, the practice of 
“acqui-hiring” is one such method that is not available to all 
companies.73  “Acqui-hiring” is a “novel and increasingly common 
tool” by which the large and successful technology companies buy 
startups in order to satisfy their intense demand for engineering 
talent.74  In an “acqui-hiring” transaction, the corporate buyer has 
little interest in acquiring the startup’s projects or assets.75  Instead, 
the primary motivation is to hire, by acquisition, the startup’s 
engineers.76  Thus, the buyer benefits by obtaining the services of 
engineers and entrepreneurs with expertise in a certain field.77  Many 
Silicon Valley giants, including Facebook and Google, are engaging in 
“acqui-hiring” at a rapid pace.78  However, smaller companies are 
priced out of this method because only the larger companies with 
sufficient capital can afford to execute such complex transactions.  
Therefore, the vast majority of Silicon Valley companies that wish to 
stay competitive in the market continue to use the practice of perks to 
attract and retain talent. 
Companies have also attempted, unsuccessfully for the most part, 
to incorporate noncompete agreements or contracts to prevent 
 
 70. Henderson & Spindler, supra note 68, at 1874. 
 71. Id. at 1874–75. 
 72. Id. at 1863–64. 
 73. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 1. 
 74. Id. at 281. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 294. 
 78. Id. at 283. 
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employees from working for competitors.79  Peter Cappelli, Wharton 
Management Professor and Director of Wharton’s Center for Human 
Resources, explained that one of the reasons this tactic is unlawful is 
because no-poaching agreements are unfair to employees.80  The 
practice violates both antitrust principles and employment laws.81  
Fundamentally, it “benefits the companies at the expense of their 
employees.”82  In California particularly, this practice poses a “unique 
problem” because of the difficulty in enforcing noncompete 
agreements.83  Therefore, the better practice in “terms of carrots and 
sticks” is for companies to make it attractive enough for employees 
not to leave and also more difficult for them to walk away with 
intellectual capital.84 
A third method for recruiting talent which has become 
unavailable is a practice known as “no-poaching,” in which companies 
conspire to avoid hiring each other’s employees.85  Professor of 
business economics and public policy at Wharton University, Joseph 
Harrington, describes the no-poaching agreement as “an 
unreasonable restraint of trade” and “a violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.”86  When companies agree not to 
compete for each other’s employees, the result is that workers receive 
lower wages because of the lack of competition.87  This method is 
likely to have been shut down by a class action lawsuit brought 
against Apple, Google, Intel, and Adobe Systems that was recently 
settled.88  While the companies avoided having to testify in court and 
risk the public peeking behind the curtain of their strategies, the 
negative attention and the threat of a lawsuit potentially serves as a 
deterrent to companies contemplating this method of retaining talent 
 
 79. Gilson, supra note 66, at 578. 
 80. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 66. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Jeff Elder, Tech Companies Agree to Settle Wage Suit, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2014, 6:58 
PM),  http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579522012693196966?mg= 
reno64-wsj&url=http3A2F2Fonline.wsj.com2Farticle2FSB10001424052702304788404579522012 
693196966.html. 
 86. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 66. 
 87. Elder, supra note 85. 
 88. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 66. 
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in the near future.89  Following this setback, the companies returned 
to depending on perks as a primary recruitment and retention tool. 
In light of the diminishing effectiveness of these tried practices, it 
seems logical that Silicon Valley companies embrace and commit to a 
policy of offering lavish employee perks. 
 
B.   DO THE BENEFITS REALLY FULFILL THEIR INTENDED 
PURPOSE? 
 
Proponents argue that statistical data supports a robust policy of 
providing employee perks.90  One of the ways to determine whether 
employee perks actually fulfill their purpose is to measure return on 
investment (“ROI”).91  ROI is a commonly used performance 
measure that evaluates the efficiency of an investment or compares 
the efficiency of a number of different investments.92  To calculate 
ROI, the benefit of an investment is divided by the cost of the 
investment.93  According to Incentive Magazine, Fortune’s “100 Best 
Companies to Work For” that offer “carefully crafted employee 
benefits package[s]” have reported a 10.6 percent annual return since 
1998.94  On the contrary, “companies with 40 percent or less employee 
engagement had a total shareholder return that was 44 percent lower 
than average.”95  Companies with more engaged employees produce 
twenty-nine percent more revenue on average, report a higher 
average customer loyalty, and boast higher retention rates of 
approximately forty-four percent.96 
Another rationale propelled by Silicon Valley employers is that 
perks lead to employee satisfaction, and thus retention.  Arguably, 
there is a direct correlation between happy employees and higher 
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company profits, which in turn benefits shareholders.  For example, 
Google, notorious for the assortment of perks it provides for its 
employees, has seen its stock soar 674 percent since the company 
began using perks in August 2004.97  The simple reasoning that people 
enjoy the benefits of perks is not the only argument for which 
companies treat employees well.98  Employers who endorse the policy 
refer to data, which strongly supports the “fact that organizations that 
focus on the engagement of their employees deliver stronger 
performance.”99  While the policy directly affects employee 
happiness, the policy is founded on sensible business strategies.100  
This business strategy involves providing employees with a sense of 
“engagement,” which in turn results in higher productivity, lower 
turnover rates, cost savings, and an earnest desire to work for the 
good of the company.101 
Slater Tow, a Facebook spokesperson, said the company was not 
trying to be New Age, but simply strategic.  “We don’t want to give 
aromatherapy for your dog,” he said, “[w]e want things that are 
functional for you and your family.”102  Google’s co-founders Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin expressed similar sentiments in their IPO letter: 
“We believe it is easy to be penny wise and pound foolish with 
respect to benefits that can save employees considerable time and 
improve their health and productivity.”  And that employees and 
shareholders alike should “[e]xpect [Google] to add benefits rather 
than pare them down over time.”103  These statements presume that 
the benefits are fulfilling their intended purposes. 
To the extent that lavish employee perks recruit and retain talent 
and prevent the disclosure of proprietary information, the perks 
provide value to the companies, and consequently, corporate 
shareholders.  However, the increasingly extravagant nature of 
employee perks begs the question of whether such perks are 
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functional and optimal, or simply a waste of corporate resources.104  
Sophie Kitson, Vice President of Talent, People + Vibe at PagerDuty, 
insists that “the tech boom won’t be here forever” and eventually 
employers “will regret inflating perks and salaries as the way to 
engage” employees.105  As an immediate result, the immense 
competition and density of employers in the Silicon Valley could lead 
to retention problems.106  Employees are “constantly tempted to jump 
employers, even if only to consistently bump up their 
compensation.”107 
 
C.   THE EFFECT OF IMPENDING TAX LAW CHANGES 
 
Even assuming that the perks are currently fulfilling their stated 
purposes, impending changes in tax law should concern shareholders 
with respect to corporate governance.  Recruiters report that the 
difference in perk value may be as much as twenty percent above an 
employee’s salary.108  Thus, a software engineer at Facebook, Twitter, 
or Google who earns approximately $120,000 a year in salary on 
paper actually receives up to an additional $24,000 in benefits.109  
However, these additional benefits are not reflected in the 
employee’s paycheck.  These perks are not technically free, but rather 
an alternative to paying higher wages.110  Under the current system, 
neither the company nor the employee is shouldering any taxes on 
the majority of employee perks.111 
Economic policy expert John C. Goodman described the 
business rationale underlying the practice of providing extensive 
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perks, from an economic perspective.112  Using the 2012 tax rates, 
Goodman explains how the perks make mathematical, and logical, 
sense to employers.  Taking into account the highest marginal tax rate 
for the federal income tax of thirty-five percent, the 2.9 percent 
Medicare tax, and the maximum 9.3 percent state income tax, an 
individual in California would face a highest marginal tax rate of 47.2 
percent.113  Californians with a median income face high marginal tax 
rates, because a 9.3 percent rate is applied to those with less than 
$100,000 annual income.114  For a Californian in the twenty-five 
percent federal income tax bracket, facing a 15.3 percent (Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act) payroll tax and a 9.3 percent California 
income tax, the combined marginal tax rate reaches almost fifty 
percent.115  Consequently, both the individual and the employer are 
incentivized to spend up to forty-nine cents to avoid a dollar of 
income.116  Under this logic, California employers are presuming that 
employees would choose to receive a dollar’s worth of goods and 
services in-kind rather than fifty-one cents in cash.117  Thus, even if 
the benefit is worth half its cost, it would still “be a good deal for the 
employees.”118  This is the combined effect of the progressive tax 
system and the fact that neither employers nor employees are paying 
taxes on these perks. 
This pattern is an outgrowth of the Internal Revenue Code § 132, 
which governs de minimis fringe benefits.119  De minimis fringe 
benefits are defined as “any property or service the value of which is 
(after taking into account the frequency with which similar fringes are 
provided by the employer to their employees) so small as to make 
accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”120  
The Treasury Department provides a few examples of excludable 
benefits: personal use of the copying machine; occasional theater or 
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sporting event tickets; occasional parties or group meals; holiday gifts 
of property; coffee, donuts, and soft drinks; and other similar 
incidentals.121  It also provides instances of non-excludable fringe 
benefits, such as season tickets, country club or gym memberships, 
and use of corporate recreation facilities like hunting lodges or 
boats.122  Whether a benefit is de minimis often turns on the 
frequency with which the employee receives the benefit.123  A 
taxpayer must measure the frequency of the benefit in one of two 
ways.  Primarily, frequency depends on how often an individual 
employee receives a particular benefit, rather than how often the 
total workforce receives a particular benefit.124  If it is difficult to 
determine how often an individual employee receives a benefit, then 
the taxpayer can determine frequency based on how much the 
employer provides the benefit to the entire workforce.125  These 
regulations indicate that receiving a daily benefit likely does not 
constitute de minimis fringe benefit.126 
However, the extensive benefits that technology companies are 
giving their employees are eliciting questions about “who foots the 
bill for the perks.”127  In particular, these lavish benefits have 
attracted the attention of the IRS.  A recent Wall Street Journal 
report reveals that the IRS could be targeting these fringe benefits, 
more specifically “employer-provided meals,” for the next fiscal 
year.128   In the agency’s recently released Priority Guidance Plan for 
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2014 to 2015, the IRS states that the free meals will now be 
considered a taxable fringe benefit, receiving the same treatment as 
that of a company car or phone.129  As a result, employees who 
receive two meals a day, courtesy of their company, could be 
obligated to pay an additional $4,000 to $5,000 in taxes.130 
One driving force behind the IRS’s newfound attention is that 
taxpayers are beginning to realize and decry the consequences of 
these employee perks.  The current tax policies regarding employer-
provided perks benefit companies at the expense of public 
taxpayers.131  If companies are not required to pay taxes for the meals, 
there will be fewer tax dollars to pay for government services and 
other programs.132  Therefore, in a sense, taxpayers are subsidizing 
free cafeteria meals for some of the most profitable companies in the 
nation, which happen to be centrally located in one geographical 
area.133 
Similarly, residents have expressed resentment towards shuttles 
transporting employees to and from San Francisco, a prime location 
where most Silicon Valley technology employees have chosen to 
live.134  Many shuttle stops are located at public bus stops, and the 
shuttles occasionally impede access to public vehicles or block 
bicycles and auto traffic.135  Residents have also raised complaints 
about noise and vibrations from shuttles, particularly on residential 
streets.136  Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence that some 
technology employees choose to live close to shuttle stops, causing 
real estate prices to rise further and gentrify portions of San 
Francisco.137  While perks such as these shuttle buses benefit Silicon 
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Valley employees and employers,138 they are beginning to impact 
third parties as well. 
If the IRS makes good on its promise to begin taxing employee 
perks and Silicon Valley continues to offer these “expected” perks, 
the money spent will ultimately come out of shareholder value.139  
This becomes particularly problematic when a company that 
succumbed to pressure of offering generous perks suddenly begins to 
struggle.  For example, Zynga, a social gaming company, used to 
serve employees fancy lunches and dinners every day.140  However, as 
some of Zynga’s former titles have begun to decline in popularity, the 
company’s shares in turn have fallen eighty percent since 2012.141  
Unsurprisingly, Zynga cut back on certain perks, including ending 
haircuts to employees in early 2014.142  However, regardless of 
whether Silicon Valley companies may continue providing perks 
under the current scheme, shareholders may still have a vested 
interest in examining employee perks more closely from a corporate 
governance perspective. 
 
IV. AN INADEQUATE SYSTEM  
OF MEASURING THE VALUE OF PERKS 
 
Even without the changes in tax law, shareholders face a 
considerable challenge in approaching the issue of employee perks: a 
deficient system in measuring the benefit the employee is receiving, 
and consequently, shareholder value.  The practice of providing perks 
is premised on the theory that employees are receiving a benefit, and 
that benefit is what drives an employee’s motivation, efficiency, 
productivity, or desire to stay at the employee’s respective job.  As 
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Professor Jay Soled points out, receipt of in-kind benefits is 
profoundly difficult to value.143  For example, how does one measure 
the value of a private helicopter ride with the CEO of the 
company?144  When employees receive in-kind benefits, their 
consumption choices are typically constrained.145  Consequently, a tax 
on the fair market value of the benefits the employee receives is 
improper.146  Nevertheless, there is little doubt that those individuals 
who actually consume the benefit have experienced “a taxable 
accretion to wealth.”147  What emerges from this scheme is a “riddle” 
about just how much one has benefitted, and how to accurately 
measure the value of that benefit.148 
 A system of providing in-kind perks makes calculating 
employee compensation more complex.  Under the traditional 
structure of compensation, employees are compensated in cash, with 
benefits such as health care standardized for the most part.  
Accordingly, shareholders would be able to access a reliable and 
transparent system of measuring employee compensation.  
Conversely, in-kind perks are not consumed by all employees, and for 
the ones who do benefit, it is difficult to measure the level of 
consumption.  For example, engineers in a company may all have 
access to free cardio-kickboxing classes.  One engineer may take 
advantage of this perk and attend every evening class available.  In 
this scenario, the employee has received something of value that gives 
them motivation to work harder and the employer has benefitted 
from having a more satisfied and productive employee.149  However, 
another engineer tries a class out, and decides to never come back.  In 
this alternative situation, the employer has expended financial 
resources to fund the perk, but neither the employee nor the 
employer benefits from it.  This is the complexity involved in 
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measuring the value of perks.  From a corporate governance 
standpoint, this lack of transparency poses a threat to a healthy 
balancing of interests between shareholders and management. 
 
A.   PERKS LARGELY UNADDRESSED BY THE LAW 
 
Shareholders may be upset that excessive perks have 
undervalued their share value.  In addition to being crippled by an 
inadequate system of measuring the value of perks, shareholders are 
not afforded any meaningful legal recourse under the current state of 
the law.  Several scholars have recognized that permitting this type of 
“value diversion” imposes a cost on shareholders that potentially 
reduces share value.150  Assuming that shareholders perceive the costs 
of these perks as substantially outweighing their benefits, what legal 
remedies might shareholders employ to effect the change they 
desire?151  The most applicable avenue to pursue is to file a derivative 
suit challenging the lavish perks as a waste of corporate assets, but the 
hurdles shareholders must jump through make this option virtually a 
nonoption.152 
As part of the duty of care, directors have an obligation not to 
waste corporate assets by overpaying for property or employment 
services.153  Corporate waste occurs when a corporation is caused to 
effect a transaction on terms that no person of ordinary and sound 
business judgment could conclude represents a fair exchange.154  To 
succeed on a corporate waste claim, a shareholder plaintiff must 
prove that no such person could even “entertain the view that [the 
transaction under attack] represented a fair exchange.”155  Thus, for 
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liability to exist, the defendants must have approved a transaction 
exchanging something of value for consideration so inadequate that 
“no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it 
worth what the corporation has paid.”156  If, under the circumstances, 
any reasonable person might conclude that the deal made sense, then 
the judicial inquiry ends. 
Because directors are presumed to have acted properly, the 
business judgment rule places the burden on the “party challenging 
the [board’s] decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.”157  
If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the business 
judgment rule functions to protect the decisions that the officers and 
directors made in the course of their duties.158  If, however, a plaintiff 
successfully establishes facts rebutting the rule’s presumptions, “the 
burden shifts to the defendant directors to prove the ‘entire fairness’ 
of the transaction.”159 
The business judgment rule is a high hurdle, one that is very 
rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff.  For the most part, courts 
view that a finding of waste is appropriate only in “unconscionable 
cases” where the directors “irrationally squander or give away 
corporate assets.”160  The difficulty of this test reflects the law’s 
understanding of what rules will help promote productive economic 
activity.  If courts were permitted more freely to “second guess” 
business decisions, officers and directors will be less inclined to 
approve risky transactions.161 
 Corporate waste allegations have been lodged regarding 
compensation of senior officers and directors with varying degrees of 
success.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation is one of the 
most prominent cases involving such corporate waste allegations.162  
In 2005, shareholders of the Walt Disney Company filed a lawsuit 
alleging waste and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the 
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directors.163  The shareholder plaintiffs claimed that the $130-million 
exit package that executive president and director Michael Ovitz 
received after just fourteen months of work constituted waste.164  
After a thirty-seven-day trial before the Chancery Court, the 
shareholder plaintiffs did not prevail because they could not rebut the 
presumption of the business judgment rule.165  The trial court found 
that a large severance package alone is not enough to show a lack of 
due care or to constitute waste.  The Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision.166  While the shareholders did not ultimately 
prevail, the fact that the corporate waste allegations survived through 
trial demonstrates two important points: excessive benefits is a cause 
of alarm to shareholders, and the courts are prepared to confront 
corporate waste claims. 
Similarly, in 2009, a Delaware Chancery Court upheld a claim 
brought derivatively by shareholders for waste, where Citigroup 
awarded its outgoing CEO a retirement package worth $68 million.167  
Shareholder plaintiffs alleged that the multimillion-dollar 
compensation constituted waste because the departing CEO was 
allegedly responsible for the loss of billions of dollars to the 
company.168  The court permitted the plaintiffs’ suit to move forward 
because the complaint contained well-pleaded factual allegations 
regarding the claim for waste.  The court’s decision and this initial 
victory for shareholders “signaled that large executive compensation 
packages paid by corporations that lose money may not survive 
corporate waste analysis.”169 
Despite the attention given to executive compensation, employee 
compensation largely remains within the realm of the business 
judgment rule.  While it might be good policy for judges to err on not 
questioning a company’s compensation of its executives, which 
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involves only a handful of individuals in a corporation, is the same 
policy sensible when applied to employee perks?  There is an 
important distinction between executive compensation and employee 
perks: the sheer volume of people involved is drastically different.  
For example, Google had 43,862 employees in 2013.170  In contrast, its 
executive and senior leadership is comprised of only twenty 
members.171 
 To have a chance of success, or even a partial victory as in the 
case of Citigroup shareholders,172 shareholders would have to 
persuade the court on one important point: The business judgment 
rule should be applied on a national context as opposed to a localized 
or industry standard.173  That is, the decisions that directors make 
regarding employee perks should be compared to the decisions of all 
other employers in the nation, and not only to the technology 
companies in Silicon Valley. 
 It is difficult, if not impossible, for a court to consider the 
business judgment of a company’s directors in a vacuum.  The court 
must examine that company’s decisions relative to the decisions of 
other companies.  The question then becomes: what is the 
composition of this other group?  Potentially, this other group might 
comprise of similarly situated companies: technology companies 
located in Silicon Valley.  However, beyond their similar industrial 
classification and shared geographical location, the underlying 
rationale for the policy of providing perks remains the same.  
Logically, all companies strive to recruit and retain talented 
employees, so what makes the technology industry so different that 
they feel the need to set a new industry standard? 
There is no reason why technology companies in Silicon Valley 
should be treated any differently than the rest of the nation.  These 
companies have been characterized as “outliers” in terms of the 
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benefits to provide to employees.174  They are known to experiment 
with the types of perks they provide.  But to what extent does 
deviating from the norm get rewarded, or exempted from the 
responsibilities of the rest of their peers?  In fact, new developments 
in benefits in other parts of the economy reflect a trend going in the 
opposite direction.175  Generally, employee benefits provided by 
companies located elsewhere in the United States do not resemble 
those provided in Silicon Valley.176  Employers are increasingly 
cutting back on benefits, such as retirement plans and health care, 
which used to be a standard component of a full-time employment 
package.177  According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, 
the percentage of workers with a retirement plan from their employer 
dropped from forty-seven percent in 1992 to below thirty-five percent 
a decade later.178  Additionally, between the year 2000 and 2010, the 
percentage of employees with employer provided health benefits had 
dropped by ten percent, and has continued to decline since then.179 
Ultimately, this data suggests that technology companies in 
Silicon Valley are offering more perks, in terms of type, scale, and 
value.  At present, more might be better for some employees.  
However, companies should consider other important factors, 
including tax consequences,180 shareholder value,181 and industry 
practices.182  Once these factors are taken into account, the benefits of 
a practice of offering extensive perks become less apparent.  Should 
shareholders wish to pursue legal recourse as a consequence, the 
current legal framework is ineffective. 
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B.   INCREASED TRANSPARENCY AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION 
 
 Against this legal landscape, shareholders could move towards 
progress by requesting increased transparency about the in-kind 
perks Silicon Valley companies provide to employees.  Here, 
shareholders should take inspiration from the executive 
compensation context, discussed previously relating to the business 
judgment rule.183  There are substantial parallels between executive 
compensation and employee perks.  For one, the impetus behind 
introducing legislation is similar: in the former context, the concern 
that executive pay has grown to be increasingly excessive,184 and in 
the latter, the concern that perks have become extravagant.  In both 
situations, this excessiveness has led to increased publicity, public 
outcries, and concerns from corporate shareholders.  And in terms of 
shared objectives, both situations call for increased transparency for 
the benefit of shareholders. 
There are two specific aspects of executive compensation that 
should provide guidance on implementing legislation that would 
increase transparency on employee perks: the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(“Dodd-Frank Act”)185 and state laws governing corporate 
accounting.186 
First, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates shareholder advisory voting 
for executive compensation in public corporations.187  This vote, 
known as “say-on-pay,” enables shareholders to provide input on the 
size and nature of executive compensation packages.  Under the 
statute, at least “once every [three] years, a proxy or consent or 
authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for 
which the proxy solicitation rules of the Commission require 
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compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution subject to 
shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives.”188  Say-
on-pay applies to the company’s CEO as well as executives named in 
the company’s proxy compensation table.189 
The Dodd-Frank Act is instructive because it is a manifestation 
of shareholders’ active efforts to demand increased transparency 
when corporate waste becomes a concern.  It not only sends the 
message to corporate officers and directors that shareholders perceive 
a potential problem, but that shareholders will act to address the 
problem at the legislative level.  Indeed, the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act and its continued presence in corporate law indicates that 
shareholders’ will enjoy a degree of success in demanding increased 
transparency.190  As a result, management may be more responsive to 
shareholders’ calls for change. 
It is important to note, however, that the limited nature of 
employee perks in the Silicon Valley region pales in comparison to 
the widespread growth of executive compensation throughout the 
nation.  Employee perks is a unique phenomenon concentrated 
mainly in Silicon Valley.  Thus, in requesting transparency for 
employee perks in Silicon Valley technology companies, shareholders 
should be mindful that national legislation like the Dodd-Frank Act 
may be difficult to achieve, and progressive change on a smaller scale, 
perhaps at the state level, may be the most progressive approach.  
This is where state corporate laws provide guidance. 
Under some state corporation laws, shareholders may pursue 
change in a company’s executive compensation structure by filing a 
“books and records” request.191  This type of request allows 
shareholders, under certain circumstances, to inspect a company’s 
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records.192  For example, under Delaware General Corporations Law, 
a shareholder of a Delaware corporation has a statutory right to 
inspect the books and records of the corporation.193  To exercise this 
right, the shareholder must satisfy form and manner requirements 
and have a proper purpose for the inspection.  A “proper purpose” is 
defined as any purpose “reasonably related to such person’s interest 
as a stockholder.”194  California’s Corporations Code sets forth a 
similar minimum level of information that shareholders may access.  
Under section 1601, “[t]he accounting books and records and minutes 
of proceedings of the shareholders and the board and committees of 
the board . . . shall be open to inspection upon the written demand on 
the corporation of any shareholder . . . for a purpose reasonably 
related to the holder’s interest as a shareholder.”195 
As with the Dodd-Frank Act, a right to access the “books and 
records” of a company has its shortcomings.  Executive officers and 
directors may be reluctant to hand the documents over.196  
Shareholders may be forced to resort to filing a motion with the 
court.  In 2009, a shareholder at Chesapeake Energy in Oklahoma did 
just that, after the company’s directors awarded a $75-million bonus 
to its chief executive even as the company’s stock plummeted.197  
Additionally, a filing with a court does not guarantee a right of 
inspection.  A court may deny a request altogether “if the corporation 
can show that the request is adverse to the interests of the 
corporation, or if it would unreasonably burden the corporation.”198  
Additionally, a “books and records” request can provide access to 
information, but does not ensure that a shareholder’s concerns 
subsequent to the inspection will be acknowledged.  The burden will 
fall to the shareholder to press for accountability and change. 
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Taking into account the advantages and shortcomings of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and the relevant corporations laws intended to 
increase transparency, shareholders can begin to craft legislation that 
will directly address concerns involving excessive employee perks.  By 
leveraging this information in conjunction with a broad understanding 
of the corporate waste doctrine and the business judgment rule, 
shareholders will be able to adeptly shape the precise contours of 
effective legislation. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As the practice of providing employee perks climbs at an 
alarming rate, the need to pause and consider the practical and legal 
ramifications intensifies.  While Silicon Valley technology companies 
have enjoyed economic advantages from this practice to date, 
corporate management and shareholders alike should take notice of 
impending changes in tax law relating to these perks.  Shareholders 
will consequently see the challenges in measuring how the receipt of 
in-kind perks contributes to an employee’s work performance.  
Shareholders who wish to challenge this practice will similarly realize 
that the corporate legal framework provides no effective means of 
recourse. 
The technology sector in California is booming in a way not seen 
since the dot-com bubble,199 and it is important for shareholders to 
prepare for changes in both the law and the economy.  As 
shareholders should realize, employee perks—like executive 
compensation—can become a liability, if not kept in check.200  Silicon 
Valley technology companies, as leading innovators, should proceed 
with caution rather than falling to peer pressure in an arms race.  This 
Note seeks to foster a conversation regarding the long-term 
consequences of this practice in order to prepare companies and 
shareholders for impending changes in the law, so that all 
stakeholders can adequately protect their interests. 
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